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Abstract 
This article discusses distinctions between management objectives and economic values in the uses 
of National Parks. The authors use historical and philosophical resources in the presentation of 
ideas. The article reviews some issues relating to the foundations of National Park administration, 
describing the distinction between preservation and conservationism and their connections to 
ecocentrism, anthropocentrism and deep ecology.  
The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) has 
established a six-category system of protected areas to clarify the differences between various 
objectives for protected areas including National Parks. National Parks are designated for three 
primary management objectives with equal emphasis on each, viz. preservation of species and genetic 
diversity; maintenance of environmental services; and tourism and recreation. Secondary objectives 
of National Parks include scientific, educational, spiritual and aesthetic uses, which are likely 
compatible with the primary goals. However, it is often questioned whether the primary goals are 
able to coexist among themselves. For example, recreational uses are often in conflict with the 
preservation goal. The management objectives for National Parks can be rearranged into three 
components, viz. preservation, conservation and public use.  
In the literature, the economic value of natural resources is often classified into direct use value, 
indirect use value, option value, bequest value and existence value. This value typology has 
widespread a misconception that each individual economic value category additively counts towards 
the total economic value. In a way of avoiding this confusion, the economic value of National Parks is 
to be grouped into three categories. They are preservation value, conservation-based use value and 
development-based use value. This typology employs the everyday speech and matches the IUCN 
classification of National Parks management objectives. More importantly, this classification clearly 
reveals that the economic value of National Parks is not the additive sum of the component values, 
because of incompatibility between the values pursued in the management of National Parks.  
Multiple management objectives for National Parks defined by IUCN are increasingly being 
integrated within domestic legislation by a number of countries in the world. The materials integrated 
in this article will help administration authorities of National Parks to shape up appropriate National 
Parks management strategies. 
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Management Objectives and Economic Value of National Parks: 
Preservation, Conservation and Development 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION  
 
The provision of natural areas for recreational tourism has been one of the essential items 
of government policy in many countries, because it is seen to be unprofitable for the private 
sector to supply people with natural areas for recreation due to their characteristics as public 
goods. Public goods are distinguished from private goods by having two primary 
characteristics, nonrivalry and nonexcludability in consumption. Moving from pure public 
goods to private goods in the spectrum, the term ‘quasi-public’ is often used when emphasis 
is on the presence of congestion or rivalry in the use of public goods.  
National Parks have great importance in providing people with requirements for recreation 
as possibly quasi-public goods (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Kahn, 1998). Congestion beyond 
a particular level can reduce the quality of the consumption available to visitors, and the use 
of a National Park by one additional individual begins to be intruding on the use of the park 
by another. Additional visitors can no longer enjoy the good without reducing others’ 
enjoyment. The presence of these phenomena is due to the fact that the park area supplied is 
physically limited.  
The Yosemite Park Act 1864 was the first actual expression of the necessity for planned 
public use of natural environments at the national level. A few years later, the Yellowstone 
Park Act 1872 dedicated and set apart the Yellowstone region of the USA as the world’s first 
National Park. The principal purpose of the designation was to preserve exceptional natural 
resources for the benefit and enjoyment of the people (Runte, 1979). However, this notion 
contained the inherent friction of use and preservation directives.  
Monumentalism rather than environmentalism was the driving impetus behind the 
Yellowstone Park legislation (Runte, 1979; Cronon, 1995): early American National Park 
advocates argued that wilderness and unusual natural beauty should be set aside, never to be 
changed, and kept sacred just as they are, for the ultimate purpose of public enjoyment. The 
first National Park in the world was the result of lobbying by a host of competing interests, 
and not only fed the dreams of preservationists but also served the interests of railroad 
owners, who were eager to transport tourists (Satchell, 1997). Cronon (1995) described an 
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irony of the National Park movement at that time with heavy sarcasm: Native Americans, 
who were the original inhabitants in the wilderness areas, were forced to move elsewhere so 
that wealthy city folks could safely enjoy the illusion that they were seeing their nation in its 
pristine, original state.  
It was possible to achieve the goals of both preservation and recreation during the early 
days of National Parks because use pressures were low (Stankey, 1989). However, people 
nowadays demand outdoor recreation as part of their life. Lack of time and money denied this 
to most people, particularly in developing countries, but increasing prosperity has gradually 
reduced these barriers. Nature-based outdoor recreation is more in demand as urbanization 
continues around the world. The more artificial their living environment becomes, the more 
eagerly people tend to stay away from home and to find comfort in nature-based recreational 
areas. National Parks have been affected by the intrusion of various recreation facilities to 
meet recreation demand. Even though tourism is considered as a clean industry, it relies on 
intensive development and provision of more convenient and sometimes luxurious facilities 
to attract wealthier tourists (Cronon, 1995). Nowadays, the construction of roads into 
National Parks and trails and parking lots within the parks is justified for the reason that to 
exclude people is to risk the loss of their support for the National Park idea (Morgan, 1996). 
A major consequence has been the alteration of the nationally significant natural and cultural 
resources upon which tourism depends. Almost every part of the world has been aware of the 
negative impacts of such development over the park ecosystem.  
It is necessary to examine closely the definition and management objectives for National 
Parks, in order to understand precisely the contemporary dilemma of National Parks 
management strategies. To this end, the definitions of National Parks suggested by 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) are first 
examined in the next section. A way of categorizing National Park benefits is then developed 
in line with management objectives for National Parks identified by the IUCN. Attention is 
next drawn to the conceptual distinction between the terms ‘preservation’ and ‘conservation’ 
in the context of classification of non-market National Park benefits. Finally, summary and 
concluding comments are provided to highlight the contribution of the paper or value added 
to existing understanding of the subject matter. 
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2.   MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES FOR NATIONAL PARKS   
 
Nearly 100 years after the Yellowstone Act 1872, the 10th General Assembly of the IUCN 
meeting in New Delhi in 1969 considered the situation of the increasing use of the term 
‘National Park’ with increasingly different status and objectives, and formalized the 
definition of the term. According to the definition, a National Park is a relatively large area 
where: 
 
(1) one or several ecosystems are not materially altered by human exploitation and 
occupation, where plant and animal species, geomorphologic sites, and habitats are 
of scientific, educational, and recreational interest or which contain a natural 
landscape of great beauty;  
 
(2) the highest competent authority of the country has taken steps to prevent or eliminate 
exploitation or occupation in the whole area and to enforce, effectively, the respect 
of ecological, geomorphological or aesthetic features that have led to its 
establishment; and  
 
(3) visitors are allowed to enter, under special conditions, for inspirational, educational, 
cultural, and recreation purposes (reported by Burdened and Radosevich, 1972, p. 
264).   
 
In 1978, the IUCN established a five-category system of protected areas to clarify the 
distinction between various objectives for protected areas including National Parks. The 
definition of National Parks remained the same as above. In 1993, the IUCN modified the 
classification system of protected areas into six categories and revised the definitions in order 
to make each more distinct from the others, as indicated Table 1.1 In this classification 
system, all categories are considered equally important, but they imply varying degrees of 
human intervention.  
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Table 1. Matrix of management objectives for various protected areas. 
Category of protected areas 
Management objective 
Ia Ib II III IV V VI
Scientific research 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 
Wilderness protection 2 1 2 3 3 - 2 
Preservation of species and genetic diversity 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 
Maintenance of environmental services 2 1 1 - 1 2 1 
Protection of specific natural or cultural features - - 2 1 3 1 3 
Tourism and recreation - 2 1 1 3 1 3 
Education - - 2 2 2 2 3 
Sustainable use of resources from natural ecosystem - 3 3 - 2 2 1 
Maintenance of cultural or traditional attributes - - - - - 1 2 
Categories:  
                      
                      
                     
                      
 
 
 
Priorities: 
Ia  
Ib     
II     
III  
IV 
V 
VI 
 
1 
2 
3 
- 
Strict nature reserve 
Wilderness area 
National park 
Natural monument 
Habitat or species management area 
Protected landscape or seascape 
Managed resource protected area 
 
Primary objective 
Secondary objective 
Potentially applicable objective 
Not applicable 
 
With regard to Category II, ‘National Park’, the IUCN defines it as a natural area of land or 
sea, designated to: 
 
(a) protect the ecological integrity of one or more ecosystems for present and future 
generations; 
 
(b) exclude exploitation or occupation inimical to the purposes of designation of the 
area; and 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1 The term ‘protected area’ is defined as ‘an area of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and 
maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through 
legal or other effective means’ (IUCN, 1994, p. 7). 
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(c) provide a foundation for spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and visitor 
opportunities, all of which must be environmentally and culturally compatible 
(IUCN, 1994, p. 19). 
 
The definition above, compared to the one it replaced, clearly states that the aim of 
ecosystem protection is to provide present and future human benefits. For instance, the phrase 
‘environmentally compatible’ in (c) above, which was newly added to the definition, is more 
positive in accepting recreational uses than the phrase ‘under the special condition’ which 
appeared in (3) before the definition of National Park was revised in 1993. This revision 
reflects the increasing demand for natural resources for recreation. 
In the 1993 revision, the IUCN identified the primary and secondary goals for each 
category. Table 1 illustrates the various mixes and priorities accorded to nine management 
objectives for each category. According to the matrix, National Parks are designated for three 
main management objectives with equal emphasis on each. They are preservation, 
maintenance of environmental services, and recreation and tourism. The IUCN also set the 
secondary and potential objectives, which include the continuing provision of environmental 
resources over generations for education and scientific research, and sustainable use of 
resources from natural ecosystem.  
According to Loomis (1993), the idea of establishing National Parks emerged as a contrast 
to multiple uses of public lands. Nonetheless, the philosophy of a single dominant use – viz. 
preservation – has never arisen in the National Park history. Rather, the multiple management 
objectives for National Parks defined by IUCN are increasingly being integrated within 
domestic legislation by a number of countries in the world.  
The management goals for National Parks set by the IUCN can be rearranged into three 
components, viz. preservation, conservation and public use. It can be argued that this 
classification sounds arbitrary in the sense that the IUCN (1994) did not use the word 
‘conservation’ in enumerating the National Parks management goals. However, scientific, 
educational, spiritual and aesthetic uses, and some types of recreational uses can all be 
reduced to one category, i.e. ‘conservation’.  
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3. CONVENTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE 
ECONOMIC VALUE OF NATIONAL PARKS 
 
There is a vast literature that discusses the topology of economic value of natural 
resources. The literature has usually broken the economic value of natural resources into use 
value and non-use value, the latter also being referred to as passive use value. The use class 
of economic value consists of direct and indirect, present and future use value for current 
generations. The non-use class of benefits falls into two subcategories, namely bequest value 
and existence value. Benefits of National Parks are commonly classified in line with this 
convention. For example, Figure 1 illustrates the use and non-use values that a National Park 
provides. 
 
Figure 1. The economic value of a National Park. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bateman and Turner (1993); Barbier (1994). 
 
Direct use benefits of a National Park may arise as a result of recreational or withdrawal 
activities that occur on the forest. Examples would include the scenic beauty conferred by a 
natural vista or timber harvested from the forest. Indirect use benefits refer to those 
associated with ecological services such as carbon sequestration and water purification. 
Option value is defined as the potential use benefit, opposed to present use value, of an 
Economic value
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environmental good. The value is viewed, in other words, as the willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for preservation of a natural resource that will be made use of at a later date by the present 
generation. Bishop (1982) provided an excellent review of the evolution along with an 
extension of the concept of option value. It is known that Weisbrod (1964) originated this 
concept by proposing that many individuals expect they may possibly visit a National Park 
for example and are willing to pay for an option that would guarantee their future access.  
Bishop (1982) extended the concept of option value with supply side uncertainty. If a risk 
averse consumer was certain of demanding the services of an environmental asset in the 
future and uncertain about its future availability, there exists a positive option value. That is, 
the maximum WTP to avoid the risk to the supply of the environmental resource is larger 
than the expected loss. This concept is grounded on the fact that an individual will be willing 
to pay more than the expected consumer surplus in order to ensure that he or she can make 
use of the environmental resource later on. Edwards (1988) reported empirical evidence of 
positive option value from a study of households’ WTP to prevent uncertain future nitrate 
contamination of groundwater in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Bishop noted that option value 
ceases to exist in the case of supply side certainty.  
Quasi-option value is present when there is uncertainty about future availability of a 
natural resource given some expectation of the growth of knowledge about natural 
environments. In particular, the value of additional information about goods subject 
irreversible changes is of importance (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). For example, there are 
uncertain benefits for scientific purposes from the preservation of a tropical forest, but these 
benefits could become more certain through time as information is accumulated about the 
uses to which the forest habitat can be put (Pearce and Turner, 1990). Arrow and Fisher 
(1974) originally introduced the concept of quasi-option value in the context of an 
irreversible development decision. Quasi-option value is always positive if the expected 
increase of information about a natural resource is independent of a proposed development of 
the environmental asset. In contrast, as Freeman (1984) argued, if the uncertainty is primarily 
about the benefits of development, this strengthens the case for development. That is, the 
quasi-option value of preserving options is negative.  
Krutilla (1967) argued that many persons may be willing to pay for the satisfaction derived 
from knowledge of the bequest of unique environmental resources to future generations. 
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Thereafter, bequest value is often defined as the benefit accruing to current generations from 
knowing that future generations will benefit from the resources. This concept takes a strong 
stance for intergenerational moral duty so as to prevent future sufferings from environmental 
degradation.  
Pearce and Turner (1990) defined existence value as a value placed on an environmental 
good and a value that is unrelated to any actual or potential use of the good. Solow (1993) 
supported the view that particular landscapes or species have to be preserved for their own 
sake because they are intrinsically important to preserve. Expectedly, existence value is often 
recognized on the basis of ecocentric value orientation that nature has the right to exist for its 
own sake, and destruction of species and wilderness is intrinsically wrong. In fact, the 
concept of existence value becomes confusing when it is mixed with that of intrinsic value of 
a resource. The non-market valuation literature, based on neoclassical economics, often 
resorts to the term ‘economic value’ to avoid the confusing use of the term ‘existence value’ 
(Lockwood, 1999). The underlying idea is that no objective existence has strictly intrinsic 
value; all values in objects are extrinsic only. Further, even intrinsic value is a human value 
as long as the value depends on human beings, because without humans valuing nature there 
would be no value (Lewis, 1962; Brennan, 1988). Mitchell and Carson (1989) viewed the 
term ‘intrinsic’ as being contradictory to the term ‘economic’ and argued that intrinsic value 
cannot be part of economic value. In the same context, Bateman and Langford (1997) 
clarified that existence value is a human value whereas intrinsic value is a non-human value, 
which cannot be estimated.  
Economic value, which is tantamount to anthropocentric value, covers bequest value and 
existence value as well as use value, as depicted in Figure 1. There is, however, considerable 
disagreement in the literature regarding the typology of economic value attributed to non-
market environmental assets. For example, Bateman and Turner (1993) regarded recreational 
use value as indirect use value whereas Mitchell and Carson (1989), Barbier (1994), and 
Pearce and Moran (1995) classed it as direct use value. As Walsh et al. (1984) pointed out, 
bequest value in fact clouds the distinction between option value and existence value. Randall 
and Stoll (1983) and Mitchell and Carson (1989) treated bequest motives as a source of 
existence value. As Bateman and Turner (1993) noted, however, bequest value is often 
considered as an intergenerational option value as far as it is motivated by concern for 
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potential use value. Mitchell and Carson (1989) divided existence value into two 
subcategories, namely stewardship and vicarious consumption. Stewardship value is 
generated from a desire to see public resources used in a responsible manner and conserved 
for future generations. Stewardship value may belong in the class of option value in Pearce 
and Turner’s (1990) sense. A person can view countryside indirectly or through media such 
as photographs and TV programs. The experience can be expressed as a form of use value. 
To some extent, the person can gain pleasure from knowing about the enjoyment of other 
people, via wildlife TV programs and photos. In some economics literature, this kind of 
benefit is known as ‘vicarious’ value. Vicarious value may be related to an intra-generational 
option value. In practice, it may be difficult to distinguish the motivation behind vicarious 
value from the individual’s own indirect use.2  
Some authors have indicated that the economic benefits of natural resources could be 
grouped in a different way. Greenley et al. (1981) and Walsh et al. (1984) came to the view 
that a single category – i.e. preservation value – can cover option value, bequest value and 
existence value. Cutter et al. (1991) suggested that benefits regarding natural resources could 
be classified along a spectrum from exploitation to conservation to preservation. They 
defined exploitation as the complete and maximum use of a resource for individual or social 
gain in the short-term; conservation is the wise utilization of a resource so that use is 
tempered by protection to enhance the resource’s continued availability; and preservation is 
the non-use of a resource by which it is fully protected and left unimpaired for future 
generations. In the same token, Bateman and Turner (1993) suggested that all the value 
components be sorted into development benefits and conservation benefits. They also implied 
that some recreational use value arising from development be classified into development 
benefits whereas recreational benefits based on conservation be regarded as conservation 
benefits. Certainly, some recreational uses need artificial facilities whereas some others do 
                                                          
2 As a side issue, there is a debate in valuation literature (Walsh et al., 1984; Mitchell and Carson, 1989) as to 
whether the economic value of a non-market environmental good is separable into the several components. 
Mitchell and Carson (1989) argued that if one assumes this is possible, the person makes an error called 
‘fallacy of motivational precision’ – the error of assuming that respondents are aware of what motivates their 
value judgments to the degree of precision desired by the researcher. They suggested one may be able to obtain 
meaningful estimates of various types of benefits that respondents might receive from a given amenity, if each 
respondent is first asked to state a total WTP amount and next how much they would pay for each subcategory 
out of this total amount. 
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not. Therefore, a distinction should be made between development-based use value and 
conservation-based use value. Economists have not paid appropriate attention to this issue. 
Putting all these suggestions together, the economic value of National Parks can be divided 
into the categories of preservation value, conservation-based use value and development-
based use value.  
This alternative way of classifying the economic value of a National Park is illustrated in 
Figure 2. The categories employ the terms used in the everyday speech of laymen. Most 
importantly, these value classifications correspond with management objectives for National 
Parks as espoused by IUCN. Thus, it can be said that the economic value of a National Park 
is conceptually equivalent to the integrated social value placed on management objectives for 
the National Park. 
 
Figure 2. Alternative classifications of the economic value of a National Park. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preservation relates to long-term economic value whereas conservation and current 
intensive use relate to medium-term and short-term economic value, respectively. The 
categories also reflect a spectrum of sustainability views about the extent to which weak or 
strong conditions should be imposed to achieve sustainable use of resources in natural 
ecosystems. Some may suggest that weak conditions on the use of natural resources will 
suffice whereas others believe very strong restrictions must be imposed (Pearce et al., 1993; 
Tisdell, 1999; Ayres et al., 2001). People who advocate the weak conditions may take some 
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loss of environmental assets for granted so long as any loss can be offset by increasing the 
stock of roads or other social capitals. A very strong sustainability view such as ecocentrism, 
on the other hand, would stress that human beings should leave natural ecosystem intact. 
Thus, it can be said that those who place more stress on development-based uses will favor 
weak conditions for sustainability. In contrast, preservation value is associated with a very 
strong sustainability philosophy. 
 
4. COEXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING NATIONAL PARK MANAGEMENT 
OBJECTIVES  
 
The categorization presented in Figure 2, relative to that of Figure 1, more clearly reveals 
that the economic value of National Parks is not the additive sum of the component values of 
the public goods, because of incompatibility between the value categories. That is, value 
linked with each of the management goals for a National Park would not positively contribute 
to the economic value of the natural asset at the same time because of the trade-off 
relationship between the goals. For example, to the extent that conservation-based use of a 
National Park is mutually exclusive of development-based use, benefits arising from each of 
these uses tend to cancel each other. Some people in some African countries may place value 
on harvesting or hunting elephants in their natural habitat, while another values viewing the 
elephants. 
It is notable that debates between preservationists and conservationists in literature are no 
less fierce than those between preservation and development. Passmore (1974) discussed the 
comparative connotation of preservation and conservation. He considered that ‘to preserve’ is 
to save species and wilderness from damage and destruction. By wilderness, Passmore meant 
what human beings have not created and what people have not yet destroyed. Preservationists 
would represent concerns to protect biological diversity from simplifying effects of human 
management, and to exclude disruption between activities in specified areas. On the other 
hand, ‘to conserve’ is to use wisely resources in such a way that use is tempered with the goal 
of maintaining their future availability or productivity. Conservationists are concerned in 
most cases about a duty to posterity. Conservationists emphasize the necessity of nature for 
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human beings’ economic purposes whereas preservationists argue that nature has to be 
preserved for its own sake. Barbier (1991) came to the parallel view that the distinction 
between preservation and conservation is important: preservation would be formally 
equivalent to outright non-use of, say, a forest resource, whereas conservation may involve 
limited uses of the forest consistent with leaving the original natural forests and ecosystem 
broadly intact.  
Preservationists appeal to established moral principles and criticize the materialistic 
attitudes of conservationists. Pearce and Turner (1990, p. 312) stated that ‘many 
preservationists feel that conservation as a compromise between development and 
preservation gives too much ground’. According to Cutter et al. (1991), the battle between 
preservationists and conservationists in fact emerged from the early period of the National 
Park history in the USA. John Muir, who was a strong preservationist and founded the Sierra 
Club in 1892, fought with a conservationist, Gifford Pinchot, over the preservation of Hetchy 
Hetchy Valley adjacent to Yosemite Valley in the Sierra Nevada. Hetchy Hetchy was a 
convenient source of water for the growing city of San Francisco and an excellent dam site. 
Pinchot believed in conservation for maintenance of the productive capacity of natural 
resources and claimed that to prevent development was contrary to the notion that resources 
could be used for general benefit of the population.  
The preservation versus conservation debate equates with ecocentrism versus 
anthropocentrism (Norton, 1986). The key question in the ecocentrism–anthropocentrism 
debate is ecological justice, which concerned with responsible relationships between humans 
and non-humans (Low and Gleeson, 1998). Anthropocentrism delivers a notion that nature is 
valued for the value it has for human beings. In contrast, ecocentrism puts humankind within 
nature, as part of natural ecosystems; human beings must contribute to the stability and 
mutual harmony of the ecosystems from the ecocentric viewpoint. Moreover, deep ecologists 
(e.g. Naess, 1984) view that nature has the right to exist independently of the wishes of 
human beings. Ecocentrism has been part and parcel of the lesson of Darwin’s evolution 
theory that human beings are one with all the other species, not one created in the image of  
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God (Worster, 1995; Hayward, 1998).3 
Many critiques (e.g. Hayward, 1998) contended that the usage of both terms ‘ecocentrism’ 
and ‘anthropocentrism’ is often misleading and confusing in practice. In particular, the 
underlying attitude of ecocentrism has been challenged for its dualism. Ecocentric camp 
argues that human beings should not plunder, exploit and destroy natural ecosystems because 
in so doing they are destroying the biological foundation of their own life. That is, the very 
human motives do justify the protection of species and natural systems (Leopold, 1979; 
Soper, 1995). Norton (1986, pp. 213-214) came to the view that respect for nature does not 
require non-anthropocentrism, and that ‘non-anthropocentrism is sufficient, but not 
necessary, to support preservationism’. Also, Sterba (1994) argued that non-anthropocentrists 
would probably agree on ‘the principle of human self-defence’ that a defending action for 
oneself and other human beings against harmful aggression is permissible even when it 
necessitates killing or harming animals or plants, because human beings are not inferior to 
other species. It can be seen that it is not humans per se but rather human-centeredness that is 
criticized the ecocentric camp (Fox, 1989). Of course, anthropocentrism literally refers to 
human-centeredness. However, it is unobjectionable and not ethically wrong that human 
beings should be interested in humankind. Moreover, human-centeredness may be desirable 
from the perspective of ecocentrism to the extent that self-love can be regarded as a 
precondition of loving others (Hayward, 1998): a positive concern for human well-being does 
not automatically preclude a concern for the well-being of the rest of the natural world, and 
may even serve to promote it. Indeed, anthropocentric standpoint shares some elements of 
ecocentrism in the sense that no anthropocentrist would reject the fact human beings can 
                                                          
3 Ecocentric perception of nature is not unique to a particular community or was prevailed at particular times. 
Heraclitus of Ephesus in ancient Greece taught that human beings are a part of the interwoven living totality of 
nature (Cloudsley, 1995). Ancient Chinese Taoism leans towards a holistic worldview. It stresses that humans 
need to put themselves in respectful harmony with whatever exists (Capra, 1977; 1983). Jewish talmudic law, 
bal tashchit (meaning ‘do not destroy’) has often been quoted in demonstrating Jewish attitudes to the 
environmental crisis (Schwartz, 1997). Passing to current Latin America, Mexican modern industrialization 
has taken off under the doctrine of ecodesarollo, which means ‘development without deterioration’ (Graham, 
1991). Native Canadians in the Okanagan region in British Columbia believe that their body is a piece of the 
land and that the soil, the water, the air and all the other life forms contributed parts to be their flesh 
(Amstrong, 1996). There are examples of eco-villages that carry on economic activities in harmony with 
nature around the world. For instance, about 100,000 Ladakhis in India along the Himalayan border with 
China still remain with their way of life fitted in with the forest, not threatening the balance of the ecosystem 
in accordance with their Buddhist economics (Bunyard, 1984).  
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never be free of the nature of nature. In sum, one should avoid the temptation to divide 
people neatly into an ecocentric camp and an anthropocentric camp (Pepper, 1984). 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
National Parks provide a variety of benefits such as recreation opportunities, watershed 
protection, wilderness, and wildlife habitat. The recreational experience of wilderness can be 
recognized as probably the highest valued service provided by natural forests. However, 
promoting tourism is not the sole primary role of National Parks. Nor is the preservation of 
species biodiversity or the provision of a rich natural resource, which permits scientists, 
educators and the community at large to meet their various needs. Inherently, the debate over 
management goals for National Parks often centers on how to strike a balance between 
leaving areas in their natural or near-natural state, and developing and exploiting them. The 
economic rationale of having multiple objectives of National Park management is that the 
economic benefits of various objectives would be greater than the benefit from any single 
objective. However, it should be recapitulated that the primary concern of National Park 
management authorities would not be maximization of the economic value of a National Park 
as a whole. Rather, the conceptual and physical compatibility between the management 
objectives should be the central issue of National Park management. 
Preservation value embodies the welfare of particular species and whole ecosystems, but 
ultimately appeals to human welfare. It is not possible to eliminate anthropocentric element 
from nature protection motives. Stated another way, preservation value may stem from 
altruistic motives such as sympathy, responsibility and a concern about the state of the world 
that some people may feel towards non-human objects, but the value is still anthropocentric 
and does not reveal the value independent of human wants. In this sense, economic value 
categories in Figure 2 do not represent the total value of environmental resources. 
Undoubtedly, the economic value of a specific environmental change represents only part of 
total value of the environmental change because there might be some values that cannot be 
captured in monetary terms. These are of value in themselves and not for human beings, i.e. 
values that exist not just because individual human beings have preferences for them. 
However, a manifest distinction should still remain between preservationists who argue to 
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stop all use or development of some valuable areas and resources, and conservationists who 
encourage careful husbanding of resources yet do not condemn their use. The concept 
‘conservation’ could easily lead to substantial modification, domestication and possibly even 
destruction on natural environment.  
This paper demonstrated how the IUCN classification of National Park management 
objectives links with the economic value of a National Park. Although one does not have to 
follow the IUCN classification, a number of countries in the world are increasingly adopting 
the National Park management philosophy embedded in the multiple management objective 
system. The fact is that conflicts are rampant not only between the management objectives, 
but also within the same objective category. For example, there are many different types of 
recreational activities ranging from conservational use to intensive use that can take place in a 
National Park. The material integrated in the article is not aimed to resolve use conflicts, but 
to clarify that the corresponding economic value of each of National Park management 
objectives is not the additive sum of the component values of the public goods, because of 
incompatibility between the value categories. The classification often illustrated in the 
literature as in Figure 1 has widespread a misconception that each individual economic value 
category of a National Park additively counts towards the total economic value. 
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